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THE FUTURE OF THE STUDENT ANTISWEATSHOP MOVEMENT: PROVIDING ACCESS
TO U.S. COURTS FOR GARMENT WORKERS
WORLDWIDE
ALLIE ROBBINS

∗

On December 16, 2011, the United States Department of Justice issued a
positive business review letter stating that universities may individually
decide to license their apparel only to brands whose supplier factories pay
workers a living wage, respect the right to organize unions, and provide
safe and healthy working conditions.1
This letter marks a huge moment for the student anti-sweatshop
movement, and has served as a catalyst for renewed discussion on the
future of the movement. In this article, I explore the idea that jobber
agreements—agreements between brands and unions governing working
conditions in supplier factories—may be the best way forward for the next
phase of international solidarity campaigns by the student anti-sweatshop
movement.2
In Part I, I provide a short history of the student anti-sweatshop
movement within the United States.3 In Part II, I examine the possibility
that a series of jobber agreements could be signed between brands and a
consortium of unions around the world, which coupled with university
policies, would require that collegiate apparel be produced in factories that
respect workers’ rights.4 In Part III, I address the question of why access to
U.S. Courts is so important.5 Part IV looks at the notion that jobber
agreements would provide garment workers with access to United States

Allie Robbins is presently Director of Student Affairs and Co-Coordinator of Bar
Exam Support Programs at CUNY Law School. She would like to thank her
colleagues at CUNY Law School as well as the CUNY Law alumni writing group for
their support and feedback. She would also like to thank the staff and students of
United Students Against Sweatshops for all of their work throughout the years.
1
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t. of Justice, Justice Department Will Not Challenge
Worker Rights Consortium’s Designated Suppliers Program For Collegiate Apparel,
Antitrust 11-1656 (Dec, 16, 2011), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/December/11at-1656.html.
2
This idea is not an original one. It has been discussed by USAS and USAS’ allies as
a next step. I believe the origin of the idea can be credited to international solidarity
guru Jeffrey Hermanson.
3
See infra Part I.
4
See infra Part II.
5
See infra, Part III.
∗
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courts as third-party beneficiaries.6 In Part V, I caution that forum selection
clauses are crucial as recent forum non conveniens jurisprudence has not
looked favorably upon foreign plaintiffs suing U.S. corporations.7 Part VI
briefly discusses the practical implementation of jobber agreements in the
global collegiate apparel industry.8
PART I
HOW WE GOT HERE: A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE STUDENT ANTISWEATSHOP MOVEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES
As in many social movements throughout U.S. history, college students
have played a critical role in the anti-sweatshop movement in the United
States. It is precisely because this has been a movement—and not merely a
stagnant organization—that it has been so successful. The history of the
movement has been one of continuous adaptation as multinational
corporations seek to evade negative publicity and abdicate responsibility
for the conditions under which their goods are produced.
United Students Against Sweatshops (USAS) was formed in 1997 by a
group of undergraduate students who wanted to ensure that the apparel that
bore their schools’ logos was made under conditions that respected the
rights of the people who made the apparel.9 USAS members recognized
early on that workers’ rights are human rights and that the conditions in
garment factories were unacceptable.10 The first nationwide campaign
centered around pressuring colleges and universities to sign codes of
conduct that outlined the conditions under which their collegiate apparel
was to be manufactured.11 The USAS model acknowledged the unique
power that students possess within the college and university setting, and
developed from the recognition that educational institutions have a
responsibility to ensure that the apparel they license is made under safe and
adequate conditions. A brand12 is legally permitted to produce apparel
bearing that school’s logo only when it purchases a license from a college
6

See infra Part IV.
See infra Part V.
8
See infra Part VI.
9
Telephone interview with Benjamin McKean, former Nat’l Organizer for United
Students Against Sweatshops (Aug. 31, 2011).
10
See infra Part V.
11
Telephone interview with Benjamin McKean, supra note 9.
12
Throughout this article, the terms brand, licensee, and manufacturer may be used
interchangeably. I prefer the term brand because it highlights the fact that most of these
companies are merely names – the design and production are contracted out to
subcontractors around the globe. In addition, a large reason behind the success of antisweatshop organizing can be traced to the importance these companies place on their
brand image.
7
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or university.13 Thus, schools hold tremendous power in the global garment
industry. USAS’s code of conduct campaign marked the first time that
anyone attempted to hold colleges and universities accountable for how
they handled this power.14
This endeavor was far from inconsequential, as the collegiate apparel
industry has been valued at $4 billion in the United States alone.15 Despite
staunch resistance from university administrators and the brands to whom
they license their logos,16 USAS held protests and sit-ins on campuses
across the country.17 Students at seven universities held sit-ins during the
spring semester of 1999, with students at the University of Arizona sitting
in for a total of 225 hours.18 The next spring, fifteen more schools followed
suit.19 The students won. Today, hundreds of colleges and universities have
codes of conduct that serve as guidelines for the conditions under which
their collegiate apparel must be made, and university administrators have a
responsibility to the people who produce goods bearing their school’s

13
Glenn S. Bacal, Collegiate Trademark Licensing: The Basic Rules of the Game,”
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY DEPT. (Jan. 11, 2007), http://www.asu.edu/counsel/brief/
trademark.html.
14
See United Student Against Sweatshops, UNITED STEELWORKERS, http://www.usw.
org/our_union/allies_and_partners?id=0006 (last visited Mar. 27, 2011) (explaining
that because students knew “that their universities had the power to demand that
apparel bearing their logo be made in a factory where workers rights are protected,” the
students demanded the schools adopt a code of conduct for licenses and developed a
code of conduct monitoring system to enforce the adopted codes of conduct.).
15
Peter Drier, Is the Perfect Factory Possible?, THE NATION (Oct. 19, 2011),
http://www.thenation.com/article/164072/perfect-factory-possible. The high value of
the collegiate apparel industry is somewhat unique to the United States, as our nation’s
obsession with collegiate athletics renders collegiate apparel quite valuable. See
Christopher Candland, What Do Corporate Codes of Conduct Do? The Effectiveness of
Codes in Improving Internationally-Recognized Core Labor Standards in Thai
Production of U.S. Collegiate Apparel and Footwear (Sept. 3, 2004), http://www.
wellesley.edu/Polisci/Candland/codes.pdf (explaining that “the collegiate apparel
industry was valued at $2.5 billion” in 1999, accounting for one percent of the U.S.
apparel industry).
16
Opposition initially had three phases. First the brands denied there were any labor
issues at their supplier factories at all. Then the brands denied they were responsible for
the problems. Then the brands began to adopt corporate social responsibility language
and alter the way they interacted with university administrators. Interview with
Benjamin McKean, supra at 9.
17
Duke University students held the first sit-in, which lasted thirty-one hours. Denise
K. Magner, Duke Students Stage Sit-In to Insure That Campus Apparel Doesn’t Come
From Sweatshops, THE CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC. (Feb.1, 1999), http://chronicle.com/
article/Duke-Students-Stage-Sit-In-to/112614/.
18
Aaron Kreider, Sit In! A Tactical Analysis, CAMPUS ACTIVISM (Jan. 19, 2005),
http:// www.campusactivism.org/uploads/sit-in-tactical-analysis.pdf.
19
Id.
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logo.20
One of the key components of this code of conduct campaign was
quarterly disclosure of the names and locations of the factories producing
collegiate apparel.21 The structure of the global garment industry was (and
remains today) such that a major collegiate apparel brand, such as Nike or
Russell, produces its collegiate apparel at hundreds, sometimes thousands,
of factories worldwide and moves production to different factories every
few months.22 The brands generally do not own these factories, but
subcontract production to supplier factories owned by middlemen. To have
an impact in this industry, therefore, USAS activists had to identify which
factories were producing collegiate apparel and understand the nature of
those factories’ production cycles.23 Thus, along with codes of conduct,
USAS demanded that the brands producing collegiate apparel disclose to
their university licensors the names and addresses of all factories producing
collegiate apparel for that brand every quarter.24 This requirement quickly
became even more contentious than the regulatory provisions of the codes
of conduct. Brands launched a major opposition claiming that this
information was a trade secret and that its release would destroy the global
garment industry and lead to industrial espionage.25 Despite this opposition,
students were successful. Major collegiate apparel brands now provide the
names and locations of the factories producing collegiate apparel to their
university licensors.26 The universities, in turn, provide this information to

20

Sarah Chavez, Workers Rights Consortium and University Logos ( 2007),
available at http://irps.ucsd.edu/assets/020/8408.pdf.
21
David J. Doorey, Can Factory Disclosure Improve Labor Practices in the Apparel
Industry? A Case Study of Nike and Levi-Strauss, 4 COMP. RESEARCH IN LAW & POL.
ECON. 1, 13-15 (2008); see also UNITED STUDENTS AGAINST SWEATSHOPS, CAMPUS
ORGANIZING MANUAL, 15, available at http://www.bsos.umd.edu/aasp/chateauvert/
411/usaskit.pdf.
22
Allie Robbins, Could Sourcing From Union Shops Be Against the Law?, 5 ORIG.
LAW REV. 46, 60-62 (2009).
23
Id. at 55.
24
Id.
25
While it was not fully clear at the time what the brands meant by this, after
receiving the data, students surmised that the brands did not want consumers to know
that the same workers who manufactured their goods were producing goods for other
brands in those same factories. This, the brands feared, would begin to erode the
consumer confidence in the uniqueness of the brand’s product. Interview with
Benjamin McKean, supra note 9. It is worth mentioning that if jobber agreements were
adopted, it could once again lead to greater transparency in the garment industry as any
brand that violates an agreement by refusing to pay a premium to provide for a living
wage may be required, through the discovery process, to reveal even more information
about its financial structure.
26
This is often done through the licensing and marketing firm The Collegiate
Licensing Company, which acts as an intermediary between brands and university
licensing officials.
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the public.27 This means that if workers at a garment factory are organizing,
USAS members can know which universities’ apparel is being made in that
factory and can adjust their organizing strategy accordingly. USAS’s
disclosure victory paved the way for factory disclosure throughout the rest
of the global garment industry as well. For example, since 2005, the
International Textile, Garment & Leather Workers’ Federation has made
great strides in obtaining factory location information from major garment
producers worldwide.28
Students did not stop their organizing efforts there; the next problem for
student organizers was deciding what to do with this information. Even
with knowledge of which factories were supposed to abide by the codes of
conduct the universities adopted, and information about specific factories
that were not complying, USAS alone lacked the resources and expertise to
enforce the codes of conduct.29 In what was perhaps USAS’s boldest move,
students decided to develop an organization that would focus specifically
on monitoring the working conditions in factories that produced collegiate
apparel.30 In 1999, students began to lay the groundwork for the formation
of the Worker Rights Consortium (WRC).31 That same year, USAS
members began demanding their schools affiliate with the WRC,32 even
before the WRC held its founding conference.33 The WRC officially
opened its doors in 2000.34 Today, university administrators, students, and
labor rights experts govern the WRC.35 No brands are permitted to have
27
About the Factory Disclosure Database, WORKER RIGHTS CONSORTIUM, (last
visited May 30, 2012), http://workersrights.org/search/about_fdd.asp.
28
Factory Lists, ITGLWF, http://www.itglwf.org/lang/en/factories-list.html (last
visited Feb. 23, 2011).
29
Robbins, supra note 22, at 55.
30
At the same time, President Clinton’s Apparel Industry Partnership was becoming
the Fair Labor Association (FLA), and began to court universities to join its governing
body. Students quickly realized the FLA was simply an attempt by brands to control
the movement against sweatshops “in a way that couldn’t hurt them.” Interview with
Benjamin McKean, supra note 9.
31
See Ryan Gabrielson, SAS Publicly Announces Support of Workers Rights
Consortium, WILDCAT ONLINE NEWS (Nov. 16, 1999), http://wc.arizona.edu/papers/
93/60/08_1_m.html (describing USAS’ endorsement of the WRC).
32
Another round of sit-ins commenced and were met with staunch university
opposition. At the University of Wisconsin–Madison, for example, fifty-four students
were pepper sprayed, assaulted, and arrested during a sit-in. Ian Trupin, Trupin ’13:
Celebrating 10 Years of the Worker Rights Consortium, THE BROWN DAILY HERALD
(Sept. 27, 2011), http://www.browndailyherald.com/trupin-13-celebrating-10-years-ofthe-worker-rights-consortium-1.2638819.
33
The organizing history behind the WRC is truly a testament to the power of
student organizing. Students developed the idea for the WRC and forced their
universities to affiliate, before the organization formally existed.
34
History, WORKER RIGHTS CONSORTIUM, http://workersrights.org/about/history.asp
(providing the history of WRC).
35
Governance, WORKER RIGHTS CONSORTIUM, http://workersrights.org/about/govern.
asp. (last visited July 13, 2011).
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any involvement in the governance of the organization.36 Affiliate
universities pay an annual fee to the WRC and provide factory disclosure
information.37 The WRC in turn works with international labor rights
experts to monitor conditions in garment factories around the world.
Presently, the WRC has 181 university affiliates and five high school
affiliates,38 and employs staff in eight countries.39
Through their collaboration, USAS and the WRC have helped garment
factory workers worldwide attain better working conditions, organize
unions, and obtain higher wages.40 This has been done primarily through
solidarity with individual factory struggles.41 The WRC conducts
investigations of factory compliance with codes of conduct and makes
recommendations to its university affiliates regarding which type of action
should be taken.42 USAS members support worker organizing through
campus activism that results in universities pressuring brands to step in and
remedy code of conduct violations.43 Those brands then require factories to
recognize the workers’ union, pay higher wages, fix unsafe working
conditions, or otherwise respond to the demands of the workers.44
While this has been effective in many cases, USAS members have also
seen factories shut down shortly after workers successfully organize for
their rights, as brands pull their orders in search of unorganized workforces
and lower costs.45 Adding to the volatile nature of the industry, on January
36

Frequently Asked Questions, WORKERS RIGHTS CONSORTIUM, http://workersrights.
org/faq.asp (last visited Feb. 23, 2011) (explaining that “the WRC is governed by a 15member board, including five representatives of university administrations elected by
the University Caucus, five representatives of United Students Against Sweatshops and
five representatives of the WRC Advisory Council, an international body of human
rights and labor rights experts.”).
37
Id.
38
WRC Affiliated Colleges and Universities, WORKER RIGHTS CONSORTIUM,
http://workersrights.org/about/as.asp (last visited Feb. 21, 2011).
39
Contact Us, WORKER RIGHTS CONSORTIUM, http://workersrights.org/contact/ (last
visited July 13, 2011).
40
See, e.g., Robert J.S. Ross, A Tale of Two Factories: Successful Resistance to
Sweatshops and the Limits of Firefighting, 30 LABOR STUDIES JOURNAL 65, 65-66
(2006) (providing examples of successful worker campaigns that obtained union
recognition and benefits).
41
The WRC’s first factory investigation took place in Mexico, at the Kukdong
Factory. Myra McGriff, Nike Strike Testes WRC’s Procedures, THE OBSERVER (Feb.
16, 2001), available at, http://www.nd.edu/~observer/02162001/News/6.html.
42
Factory Investigations, WORKERS RIGHTS CONSORTIUM, http://workersrights.org/
Freports/index.asp#freports (last visited Mar. 22, 2013).
43
Robbins, supra note 22, at 56-57.
44
Doorey, supra note 21, at 15.
45
See, e.g., Nike Supplier Closes Unionized Factory, Shifts Work to Vietnam,
PEACEWORK MAGAZINE (Oct. 2007), http://www.peaceworkmagazine.org/nikesupplier-closes-unionized-factory-shifts-work-vietnam.
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1, 2005 the Multi-Fiber Arrangement (MFA), a series of quotas governing
how many garments each country could export, completely phased out.46
The anti-sweatshop movement feared that the MFA phase out would
worsen the environment for garment workers by consolidating garment
production in a few countries based on lower workers’ rights standards,
instead of permitting production in hundreds of countries worldwide.47
Brands’ continuous efforts to avoid enforcement of the code of conduct
and the phase out of the MFA created a desire for a more comprehensive
anti-sweatshop program that would prohibit companies from shutting down
factories to cut costs or to avoid dealing with an organized workforce.48 In
2005, USAS partnered with unions in the U.S. and throughout the world, as
well as other allies in the anti-sweatshop movement, to develop a structural
response known as the Designated Suppliers Program (DSP).49 According
to a proposal written at the launch of the DSP:
The program calls for universities to source their apparel from
designated supplier factories that “have been determined by
universities to have affirmatively demonstrated full and consistent
respect for the rights of their employees.” In addition to adhering
to standards embodied in university codes of conduct, factories
will also have to evidence a respect for rights of association and
pay a living wage. The USAS DSP further stipulates that
university licensees will pay these factories prices for their
products sufficient to allow factories to achieve these standards.
Prices will represent modest increases over industry norms, and
licensees will be expected to maintain the kind of long-term
relationships with these factories necessary to allow for a
reasonable degree of financial stability and job security. These
factories will produce primarily or exclusively for the university
logo goods market.50
In a nutshell, universities adopting the DSP would commit to having an
increasing percentage of their licensed apparel manufactured in factories
that respect basic worker rights. In order to accomplish this, brands would
be required to pay a premium to ensure the provision of a living wage and
46

Telephone interview with Jessica Rutter, former National Organizer for United
Students Against Sweatshops, August 31, 2011.
47
Id.
48
Robbins, supra note 22, at 62 (explaining that without comprehensive
enforcement, companies would shut down factories that respect workers’ rights
because it was cheaper to produce elsewhere or easier to avoid negotiation with an
organized workforce).
49
Id. at 2.
50
Purmina Bose, From Agitation to Institutionalization: The Student Anti-Sweatshop
Movement in the New Millennium, 15 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 213, 232-233
(2008) (emphases added).
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maintain long-term relationships with supplier factories to improve
sustainable wages and working conditions.51 Despite years of successful
organizing, the DSP has not been fully implemented, largely due to
unfounded concerns about anti-trust laws.52 Similar to their response to
USAS’ initial demands for codes of conduct and factory disclosure, brands
also argued it would be impractical to implement the DSP and that it would
upend the entire garment industry.53 Nike, Adidas, and Reebok went on a
tour of college campuses, speaking to administrators, holding events, and
meeting with licensing committees in an attempt to dissuade university
officials from adopting the principles of the DSP.54 Presently, more than
fifty schools have agreed to the framework of the DSP, including some big
names in college athletics such as the entire University of California
system, Duke University, and the University of Washington.55
Unfortunately, the Program has largely remained stagnant for six years, as
fear generated by brands has successfully stalled implementation.56 On
December 16, 2011, the United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”)
released a business review letter finding the provisions of the DSP lawful
and in compliance with anti-trust laws.57 This is a tremendous victory as
private plaintiffs have never succeeded when challenging initiatives
protected by a DOJ Business Review clearance.58 Student activists are
currently working to determine how to proceed. What remains clear,
however, is that work of the past six years cannot be undone and a new
organizing model, one maintaining the basic tenets of the DSP, must
emerge.
Over the past few years, USAS has largely returned to individual factory
solidarity campaigns, and has continued to have success with this model
despite continued attempts by brands to abdicate their responsibility and

51

Robbins, supra note 22, at 58.
Brands raised the concern that if multiple universities agree to the conditions of the
Designated Suppliers Program and decided to source only from factories on a list of
“good factories” that meet worker rights standards there would be unlawful collusion.
This, in turn, created reluctance on the part of universities to go ahead with the
Program. ROBBINS, supra note 22, at 63-70.
53
Interview with Jessica Rutter, supra note 46.
54
Id.
55
Id.
56
Robbins, supra note 22, at 63.
57
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t. of Justice, Justice Department Will Not Challenge
Worker Rights Consortium’s Designated Suppliers Program For Collegiate Apparel,
Antitrust
11-1656
(Dec.,
16,
2011),
available
at:
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/December/ 11-at-1656.html.
58
Memorandum from Scott Nova on Business Review Process for the DSP to WRC
Affiliate Universities and Colleges (Dec. 16, 2011), available at http://workersrights.
org/university/memo/121611.html.
52

128

THE LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW FORUM

[Vol. 3:1

out-organize student activists.59 Recently, for example, USAS used the
power of its universities to not only force Russell Athletic to reopen a
factory in Honduras that had been shut down after workers successfully
unionized, but also to persuade the brand not to fight unionization at its
seven other factories in Honduras.60 In addition, the WRC has continued its
factory monitoring efforts and, in the summer of 2011, successfully
pressured the June Textile Factory in Cambodia to pay severance to
workers that made collegiate apparel. In the same summer, the WRC also
successfully pressured Nike to compensate workers after PT Kizone, a
collegiate apparel factory in Indonesia, closed its doors.61 Recently, USAS
has launched a similar campaign against Adidas in response to the brand’s
refusal to pay severance to 2800 Indonesian factory workers whose factory
was shut down.62 While these victories are laudable and profoundly change
lives, the larger question remains of how to effectively create change in the
global garment industry in a manner that does not permit brands to undo
those victories as soon as they feel the spotlight is off of a particular
factory. The procurement of a positive business review letter from the DOJ
renders the moment ripe for a restructuring of the student anti-sweatshop
movement.
PART II
THE PROPOSAL: JOBBER AGREEMENTS
The answer to what the anti-sweatshop movement must do next may
lie in the movement’s own national history. Jobber agreements (also known
as Hazantown Agreements after the case that solidified a union’s right to
target jobbers),63 were a key tactic used by the International Ladies
Garment Workers’ Union to hold brands accountable for the working
59

Robbins, supra note 22, at 61.
Steven Greenhouse, Labor Fights Ends in Win for Students, NEW YORK TIMES
(Nov. 17, 2009), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/18/
business/18labor.html (describing the shutdown of a Russell Athlectic factory in
Honduras after the workers unionize and an agreement by Russell Athletics to reinstate
the workers and permit unionization in its other Honduras factories).
61
News & Updates, WORKER RIGHTS CONSORTIUM, http://www.workersrights.org/
freports/WRC%20Assessment%20re%20PT%20Kizone%20(Indonesia)%201-1812.pdf.(last visited May 30, 2012).
62
badidas: all in sweatshops?, United Students Against Sweatshops,
www.badidas.com, last visited March 22, 2013. Thus far, Cornell University, Oberlin
College, the University of Washington, Rutgers University, Georgetown University,
the College of William and Mary, Santa Clara University, and Penn State have all cut
their licensing contracts with Adidas in response to this campaign.
63
See Danielson v. Joint Bd. of Coat, Suit & Allied Garment Workers’ Union, 494 F.
2d 1230 (1974) (where “Hazantown Agreements” collective bargaining agreements
specific to the garment industry, originated).
60
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conditions in the factories to which they subcontract beginning in the early
twentieth century.64 The term jobber refers to those companies that
subcontract production of the garments they later sell to retailers (or
universities).65 These are the brands whose names most consumers
recognize, such as Nike, Adidas, and Champion. According to a recent
jobber agreement between Liz Claiborne and the Union of Needletrades
Industrial and Textile Employees (UNITE), a jobber is defined as “one who
does not manufacture garments in its own shop but who has all of its
garments produced (sewn, finished, pressed and sometimes cut) by
contractors and who may or may not employ cutters and/or sample makers
and/or distribution workers or others.”66 Similar to other jobber
agreements, the Liz Claiborne agreement states:
This Jobbers Agreement governs the overall relationship
between the Company and the Union including the
Company's use of contractors to produce its garments in the
continental United States. The terms of this Agreement are
applicable solely in the continental United States and shall
have no force and effect to any entities or operations outside
of the continental United States.67
Such agreements have successfully allowed unions in the United States to
organize garment factories, even when those factories are not owned by the
brands themselves, and subsequently force companies to provide decent
wages and benefits to garment workers in the United States. Since most
garment production has been moved outside of the United States,68 the key
to improving working conditions in the apparel industry may be to expand
the scope of jobber agreements to include workers in subcontracted
factories around the world.69 These agreements differ from collective
64
The Ladies’ Garment Worker, MONTHLY NEWSLETTER (Internat’l Ladies’ Garment
Workers’ Union), Oct. 1916, at 22.
65
See, e.g., Jobbers Agreement By & Between: Liz Claiborne, Inc., & Union of
Needletraders, Industrial & Textile Employees (June 1, 2000), http://contracts.onecle.
com/liz/unite.jobbers.2000.06.01.shtml.
66
.Id. at 4.
67
Id. at 5.
68
Scott Nova, Outsourcing Tragedy: On the 100th Anniversary of Triangle
Shirtwaist, Workers Are Still Dying in Garment Factory Fires, THE HUFFINGTON POST
(Mar. 25, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/scott-nova/outsourcing-tragedy-onth_b_84055 8.html.
69
The manufacturing industry may see even more outsourcing of jobs if the Senate
passes the “Protecting Jobs from Government Interference Act,” which was passed by
the House of Representatives on September 15, 2011 as H.R. 2587. This bill eliminates
the power of the National Labor Relations Board to force a company to reopen a
factory or production line that was closed in violation of the National Labor Relations
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bargaining agreements (the traditional contract between unions and
companies that delineate working conditions) because they cover
conditions in supplier factories not directly owned by the brand.
Under this proposal, brands would sign jobber agreements with unions
both in the United States and around the world. Presumably, several unions
from different countries would sign the same basic agreement with
addendums delineating living wages based on local conditions and laws.
For example, Nike could sign a contract with unions in the U.S., Honduras,
and the Dominican Republic, requiring all of Nike’s supplier factories in
each of the three countries to comport with the terms set forth in the jobber
agreement. Following this model, entire regions of the world could become
subject to contracts between brands and unions. These contracts would set
baseline working conditions in the garment industry and outline the
responsibilities of multinational corporations in ensuring that those
standards are met. Following the model set forth by the DSP, students
could demand that universities only license their logo to companies that
sign such jobber agreements.70 In this way the collegiate apparel industry
would become saturated with factories that respect the rights of their
employees. The basic provisions of the jobber agreements would most
likely mirror those set forth in the DSP, including respect for the right to
organize and freedom of association, long-term brand/factory relationships,
payment of a premium to provide a living wage, equality for women
workers, and the maintenance of adequate health and safety conditions.
As each university would individually adopt this requirement, as they did
with the DSP, anti-trust concerns are moot.71 Instead of presenting legal
impediments, as brands erroneously claimed the DSP did, this proposal
actually provides garment workers with additional legal protections they do
not currently enjoy. If such jobber agreements were in place, garment
workers in factories subject to these agreements would then be able to avail
themselves of the protections of the U.S. court system as third party
Act. As a consequence, it will make it easier for employers to move jobs out of the
United States. See Press Release from Kimberly Freeman Brown, Exec. Dir., Kimberly
Freeman Brown on H.R. 2587, American Rights at Work (Sept. 15, 2011),
http://www.americanrightsatwork.org/press-center/2011-press-releases/statement-bykimberly-freeman-brown-on-hr-2587-20110915-1047-418-418.html.
70
This is where the power dynamic that has led USAS to fifteen years of success
comes in. Students would pressure universities to only license their logo to brands that
sign jobber agreements (and only for production in those factories subject to the jobber
agreement). In order to remain competitive, therefore, brands would have to sign jobber
agreements. Workers and the WRC could then enforce those agreements.
71
If each university individually adopts a policy requiring a certain percentage of its
licensed apparel to be produced by brands that have signed jobber agreements, the antitrust concerns of universities colluding with one another will no longer be valid as each
school will be making independent decisions about its own licensing. Each school
already retains the right to license its logo to whomever it chooses. This is merely a
component of that right.

2013] THE FUTURE OF THE STUDENT ANTI-SWEATSHOP MOVEMENT

131

beneficiaries. They would no longer have to rely solely on the limited
resources and organizing prowess of university students in the United
States, but would themselves have legal recourse to hold brands
accountable.
PART III
WHY ACCESS TO U.S. COURTS IS CRITICAL
Garment workers could benefit greatly from bringing their claims in U.S.
courts because of the corruption and anti-union violence present in many
countries around the world. The desire to allow potential breach of contract
lawsuits to be brought in U.S. courts is not about forum shopping for the
best law; indeed, enforcement of U.S. labor laws and the strength of the
U.S. labor movement have been declining in recent decades,72 and many
countries have much stronger labor laws than the U.S.73 Instead, the desire
to allow garment workers to bring their claims in U.S. courts is about
protecting the life and liberty of garment workers who are brave enough to
stand up for their rights. According to the World Trade Organization, the
top fifteen exporters of clothing are China, the European Union, Hong
Kong, Turkey, India, Bangladesh, Vietnam, Indonesia, United States,
Mexico, Thailand, Pakistan, Malaysia, Tunisia and Morocco.74
The International Trade Union Confederation reported that labor
activists in China frequently face harassment and repression75 Striking
workers have been beaten and subject to violent and deadly reprisals, while
labor leaders have been detained and incarcerated for their organizing
efforts.76 China forbids the existence of independent trade unions
altogether, and only permits workers to join the All China Federation of
Trade Unions.77 In Hong Kong, “workers and unions continue to have little
opportunity to defend their rights in practice, and collective bargaining
72

See, Alejandro Reuss, What’s Behind Union Decline in the United States?,
DOLLARS & SENSE (Mar. 31, 2011).
73
See, e.g., Laura Clawson, German Auto Manufactures High Profits and High Pay
Show Why U.S. Labor Laws Need to Be Stronger, DAILY KOS (DEC. 28, 2011) http://
www.dailykos.com/story/2011/12/28/1049409/-German-auto-manufacturers-highprofits-and-high-pay-show-why-US-labor-laws-need-to-be-stronger?via=blog_1
(pointing out that “the German constitution itself includes a second mechanism for
keeping employees involved in the decisions of the firm for which they work”).
74
World Trade Organization, International Trade Statistics 2010 at 14 (2010), http://
wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/its2010_e/its10_toc_e.htm.
75
Int’l Trade Union Confederation [ITUC], Annual Survey of Violations of Trade
Union Rights 132 (2011), http://survey.ituc-csi.org/.
76
Id., at 134-135.
77
SOLIDARITY CTR, JUSTICE FOR ALL THE STRUGGLE FOR WORKER RIGHTS IN CHINA
(2004), available at, http://solidaritycenter.org/content.asp?contentid=928.
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rights are regularly ignored.”78 In 2010, judicial harassment toward trade
unions continued in Turkey, despite a Constitutional amendment.79
Violence against those who stand up for their rights at work is far too
common. In India in 2010, for example, police and companies violently
arrested and harassed union leaders80 In addition, the garment industry in
India has seen a wave of suicides. 81 In India, there is no legal obligation in
the private sector for employers to recognize unions or collectively bargain
with their employees, and labor protections are diminished even further
inside Export Processing Zones, where many supplier factories are
situated.82 The situation for garment workers in Bangladesh is no better. In
April 2010, garment workers faced murders and arrests when they
protested to demand a minimum wage.83 Stories like this are commonplace
in nearly all of the world’s leading textile and apparel exporting countries.
Workers in Vietnam, Indonesia, Mexico, Thailand, Pakistan, Malaysia,
Tunisia, and Morocco also face brutal violence and detention of trade union
activists.84 Organizing for basic workers’ rights is thus a very risky
undertaking.
It is not simply the repression of workers’ rights that is a concern in
many garment-producing nations. Judicial corruption further underscores
why access to U.S. courts is crucial:
A functioning judiciary is the guarantor of fairness and a powerful
weapon against corruption. But people’s experiences in many
countries fall far short of this ideal. In some countries the majority
of those who had contact with courts encountered bribe demands,
and the total amount paid in bribes can reach staggering
proportions. Corruption in the judiciary goes beyond the bribing
of judges. Court personnel are paid off to slow down or speed up a
trial, or to make a complaint go away. Judges are also subject to
78

ITUC, supra note 755, at 138.
Id. at 221-225 (workers were laid off or forced to resign and join “management
friendly organisations,” due to union membership).
80
Id. at 140 (“In the two years ending in September 2010, 910 garment workers,
including members of their family, in Tirupur, Tamil Nadu, committed suicide.
Garment factories in Tirupur produce about ninety percent of all India’s cotton
knitwear exports.”).
81
Id. at 141.
82
Int’l Trade Union Confederation [ITUC], Internationally Recognized Core Labour
Standards in India: Report for the WTO General Council Review of the Trade Policies
of India, (Sep. 2011) available at www.ituc-csi.org/IMG/pdf/final_India_TPR_Report
_3.pdf.
83
ITUC, supra note 75 at 123 (explaining that garment workers were demanding “a
[monthly] minimum wage of BDT 5,000 [US$66.62]” and noting that, during the
protests, “six workers were killed and many injured,” while “[t]rade union leaders were
arrested [and] tens of thousands of garment workers charged in connection with the
protests”).
84
Id.
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pressure from above, with legislators or the executive using their
power to influence the judiciary, starting with skewed
appointment processes.85
In Thailand, for example, a separate court system known as the Labor
Courts presides over labor law issues in the private sector.86 The Labor
Courts function as a tripartite body with a judge from the Ministry of
Justice presiding alongside one associate judge elected by employer
associations and one associate judge elected by labor associations.87 In
2006, the U.S. Department of State found frequent abuse in the judicial
system, and employers often did not pay workers their awards in full.88 An
investigation by the Thai Senate found that “as many as half of the 200
associate judges in the Central Labor Court might have paid bribes to
influence their election as judges.”89 Many judges admitted to buying their
posts, and the Senate committee found that judges who bribed their way
into office enjoyed connections with powerful people in business, often
siding with employers in labor disputes.90 Further, the Ministry of Labor
has been criticized for its failure to verify the legitimacy of corporate
registration documents.91 This environment can hardly be described as one
that would provide garment workers with a fair process for adjudicating a
claim based on the breach of a jobber agreement.
Thailand is not unique in this regard. Many other leading garmentproducing countries have notoriously corrupt judicial systems as well. In
Morocco, for example, the King appoints all government officials,
including judges.92 The influence of the King and his Minister of Justice
retain the power to step in and obstruct inquiries at any point, and they
exert that power frequently on behalf of the influential in Moroccan
85

Transparency Int’l, Annual Report 2010, 39, available at http://www.transparency.
org/publications/annual_report.
86
SOLIDARITY CTR., JUSTICE FOR ALL THE STRUGGLE FOR WORKER RIGHTS IN
THAILAND 38 (2007), available at http://solidaritycenter.org/content.asp?pl=910&sl=
910&contentid=911.
87
Id.
88
U.S. Dep’t of State Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, & Labor, Country
Reports on Human Rights Practices: Thailand, 2006, available at
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/ rls/hrrpt/2006/78792.htm.
89
SOLIDARITY CTR., supra note 86, at 39.
90
Id.
91
Id. (noting that there was no verification to ensure the authenticity and genuineness
of the companies and employer associations as well as the signatures on incorporation
and registration documents).
92
Transparency Int’l, Global Corruption Report 2007: Corruption in Judicial
Systems
233,
http://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/pub/global_corruption_report_2007_corru
ption_and_judicial_systems (last visited Mar. 22, 2013).
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society.93 Turkey’s judicial system relies largely on a series of self-selected,
unregulated expert witnesses because of limited judicial expertise,
resources, and time.94 Consequently, judges accept the reports of private
experts whose reports are often patently false.95 Public perception, even
among those involved in the legal system, is that Turkey’s judiciary is
extremely corrupt, second only to the tax department as the most corrupt
sector.96 In 1999, Professor Hayrettin Ökçesiz of Akdeniz University
conducted a survey of 666 lawyers which revealed ninety-five percent
claimed corruption existed in the judiciary. Following the survey, Professor
Ökçesiz was subjected to investigation and has not continued to further
research the issue.97
In Bangladesh, a 2010 survey by Transparency International’s
Bangladesh chapter found that eighty-eight percent of individuals who had
interacted with the judiciary said they were exposed to corruption, and it
was ranked as the country’s most corrupt institution.98 Bribing judicial
officials is commonplace, with bribes averaging twenty-five percent of
annual income of those who have used the court system.99 Extremely heavy
caseloads coupled with the rarity of disciplinary proceedings contribute to
this climate of bribery and corruption.100
Bribery is commonplace in other garment-producing countries as well.
In India, for example, personnel at all levels of the judiciary regularly
accept bribes.101 One survey found that over half of the money paid in
bribes went to lawyers, while the remaining portions were paid to court
officials, judges, and middlemen.102 Similarly, in Pakistan, bribes are paid
to judges, court employees, public prosecutors, opponent’s lawyers, and
witnesses at a price of almost 2.5 times the amount paid in bribes in other
public institutions.103 Chronic backlogs, leading to substantial delays in
both criminal and civil cases, leave Pakistan’s judiciary ripe for this type of
93

Id. at 233-235.
Id. at 280.
95
Id. (judges commonly accept private experts’ reports, and rarely discount such
patently false testimony, because they “don’t have the expertise to decide technical
issues or the time to go to the scene of a crime and there is no pool of professionals to
do it for them.”).
96
Id.
97
Id. (Since Professor Hayrettin Ökçesiz of Akdeniz University was subjected to
investigation because of this survey, no one has continued to pursue this research).
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TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 85, at 40.
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TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 92, at 179.
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Id.
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Id. at 215.
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Id. (explaining that the estimated annual bribes in India are paid in the following
proportions: “[sixty-one]percent to lawyers; [twenty-nine]percent to court officials;
[five] percent to judges; and [five] percent to middlemen”).
103
Id. at 244.
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corruption.104 In Mexico, the situation is similarly troubling. In 2010, court
decisions were noticeably susceptible to improper influence.105 Civil
society organizations pointed to corruption, judicial inefficiency, and a lack
of transparency in the judiciary as major contributing problems.106 The
judiciaries of China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Tunisia, and Vietnam also suffer
from a lack of independence and improper influence by executive branch
officials, political parties, and private business interests.107
This is merely a snapshot of anti-union violence and judicial corruption
in many garment-producing nations. While US employers have propped up
a multi-billion dollar industry around union busting, labor leaders are not
beaten or incarcerated on a regular basis and it is relatively uncommon for
judicial officials to accept bribes.108 To bring a lawsuit against a major
multinational corporation takes courage. To file such a claim in the court of
a country whose government regularly permits or sponsors violence against
trade unionists is to risk one’s life. Opening themselves up to judicial and
public scrutiny within their home countries may prove extremely dangerous
for workers in some of the world’s leading garment producing nations. This
burden may be somewhat ameliorated if a lawsuit is brought in the United
States, where the proceedings are not as readily subject to the intimidation
of corrupt, anti-union government officials.
Alien Tort Claims Act cases often involve foreign plaintiffs suing in U.S.
courts for violations of human rights, and alien plaintiffs would likely not
adjudicate in the situs state as it “would not only be disadvantageous, but
perhaps deadly.”109 The same holds true for these cases. If not able to sue in
a U.S. courtroom, outside of the direct influence of corrupt government
officials, garment workers would be exposing themselves to rampant
corruption, forced payment of bribes, and quite possibly physical assault.110
104

Id. at 247.
U.S. Dep’t. of State, Country Report on Human Rights 2010: Mexico, at 13 (Apr.
8, 2011), http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2010/ (reflecting that civil society
organization reports demonstrated court decisions were overly “susceptible to improper
influence by” state and local level “private and public entities”).
106
Id.
107
U.S. Dep’t of State, 2010 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (Apr. 8,
2011), available at, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2010/index.htm.
108
ITUC, supra note 75, at 115.
109
Matthew R. Skolnik, The Forum Non Conveniens Doctrine in Alien Tort Claims
Act Cases: A Shell of Its Former Self After WIWA, 16 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 187, 208
(2002) (“even if they were legally able to do so, few alien plaintiffs would attempt to
adjudicate international human rights law in the situs state” because of the likely,
unfavorable consequences.”).
110
Of course, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act forbids U.S. companies from bribing
foreign officials, both directly and through intermediaries. Thus, if workers were forced
to sue in a corrupt environment and a U.S. brand paid bribes to judicial official they
could be charged and imprisoned in the United States. This would not, however, result
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Thus, it is imperative that garment workers be able to sue for breach of
jobber agreements in U.S. Courts if they choose to do so.111
PART IV
THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARIES: MAKING SURE GARMENT WORKERS
QUALIFY
Generally, only the parties to a contract can recover for breach of
that contract. However, the law has provided avenues for recovery for those
outside of the two contracting entities when a party is deemed a third-party
beneficiary of the contract, as federal and most state courts follow the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts on this matter.112 New York, long the
center of the fashion industry, and a state that many garment manufacturers
still call home,113 also follows the Restatement rule.114 As both federal
courts and New York courts have adopted the Restatement approach, this
article analyzes the issue of whether garment workers in subcontracted
factories would be considered third party beneficiaries to a jobber
agreement between a manufacturer and a union in the context of the
Restatement’s standard.
According to the Restatement (Second) of Contracts,
(1) Unless otherwise agreed between promisor and promisee, a
beneficiary of a promise is an intended beneficiary if recognition
of a right to performance in the beneficiary is appropriate to
effectuate the intention of the parties and either
(a) the performance of the promise will satisfy an obligation of the
promisee to pay money to the beneficiary; or
(b) the circumstances indicate that the promisee intends to give
the beneficiary the benefit of the promised performance.
in any improvement in working conditions inside the garment factory. 15 U.S.C. §
78dd-1 (2011).
111
This is not to say that some foreign legal systems would not provide a judiciary
less prone to corporate sympathy than that of the United States. However, since jobber
agreements would be signed in the United States and most collegiate apparel brands are
headquartered in the U.S., U.S. courts make the most sense.
112
FEDERAL PRACTICE MANUAL FOR LEGAL AID ATTORNEYS § 5.3.A (Jeffrey S.
Gutman ed., 2011), available at http://federalpracticemanual.org/node/31 (“The federal
courts and most state courts follow the Restatement (Second) of Contracts in
determining the viability of any third-party beneficiary claim.”).
113
See, Della Hasselle, Designers Abandon Garment District as Groups Fight to
Save
It,
DNA
INFO
(Aug.
31,
2001),
http://www.dnainfo.com/20110831/midtown/designers-leave-garment-district-asgroups-fight-save-it.
114
LaSalle Nat’l Bank v. Ernst & Young, 729 N.Y.S.2d 671, 676 (App. Div. 2001)
(“For cases in which the claimant is not a party to the contract, but claims third-party
rights therefrom, New York has adopted the standard set forth in the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts.”).
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(2) An incidental beneficiary is a beneficiary who is not an
intended beneficiary.115
The New York Court of Appeals, summarizing the Restatement
standard, requires parties asserting third-party beneficiary rights under a
contract to establish:
(1) the existence of a valid and binding contract between other
parties, (2) that the contract was intended for their benefit and (3)
that the benefit to them is sufficiently immediate, rather than
incidental, to indicate the assumption by the contracting parties of
a duty to compensate them if the benefit is lost.116
The court will look to evidence of intent to determine whether an
intended beneficiary exists.117 According to New York’s First Department,
“the best evidence of the contracting parties’ intent is the language of the
agreement itself.”118
Language evidencing an intent for garment workers to be third-party
beneficiaries of the contract can be expressly included in the jobber
agreements. This would be ideal, as it would render any brand motions on
this issue subject to summary judgment. Many contracts do specifically
reference individuals or organizations as intended third party beneficiaries
directly in the contract language, so its inclusion need not be seen as
entirely unique. In the absence of such obvious language, however, drafters
of jobber agreements would be wise to include language specifically
delineating the reasoning for each clause of the contract. For example, if a
provision were included that required brands to maintain long-term
relationships with supplier factories, it should specifically be stated that this
is “to ensure that supplier factories receive enough orders at adequate
prices to enable them to provide their employees with stable employment.”
Similarly, a requirement that brands pay enough to allow factories to
provide a living wage to its employees could be couched in language that
makes clear that the requirement exists, “so that employees are able to earn
a living wage and supply their families’ basic needs.” This language would
serve as a further indicator of the partiers’ intent to directly benefit supplier
factory employees.
115

Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 302 (2011).
Mendel v. Henry Phipps Plaza W., Inc., 844 N.E.2d 748, 785 (N.Y. Ct. App.
2006).
117
Richard Siegler & Eva Talel, Construction Defects: Third-Party Beneficiaries,
227 N.Y.L.J. 83(2002), available at http://www.stroock.com/SiteFiles/Pub604.pdf (“if
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Absent such express language, subcontracted employees could still be
considered third party beneficiaries to a jobber agreement, provided there is
evidence of the contracting parties’ desire to empower them with such
rights. Contracts need not explicitly identify third party beneficiaries.119
Instead, a court will consider circumstances indicating “that the promisee
intends to give the beneficiary the benefit of the promised performance.”120
The court will consider whether the “manifestation of the intention of the
promisor and promisee is sufficient, in a contractual setting, to make
reliance by the beneficiary both reasonable and probable.’”121 Recently, for
example, a New York District Court found that a woman arranging hospice
care for her father demonstrated that her father was an intended third party
even though the contract between the hospice care provider and her father
did not specifically name her as a potential beneficiary.122 The agreement
itself named the woman as her father’s primary caregiver, and the Court
found this sufficient to hold that “the agreement specifically contemplated
the provision of assistance to plaintiff, as primary caregiver, by members of
the Hospice team.”123
Further, the precise identity of a third party beneficiary need not be
known at the time of the contract. Thus, the fact that a jobber agreement
would cover a large number of factories, some of which the brand may not
contract with at the time it signs the agreement, does not preclude
employees of a supplier factory from exercising rights as third party
beneficiaries. In 2011, for instance, the Third Department found that a
company that leased a medical facility was a third party beneficiary to the
contract between the landlord and the company hired to design and build
the facility, even though the leasing company had not yet been formed at
the time of construction.124
Of course, New York courts have not found that third parties were
entitled to recovery in all cases. Some of those cases in which a third-party
beneficiary was not recognized include situations in which the contract at
issue specifically “provided that nothing contained in the contract ‘shall
create a contractual relationship with or a cause of action in favor of a third

119
Finch, Pruyn & Co. v. M. Wilson Control Services Inc., 658 N.Y.S.2d 496, 498
(App. Div. 1997).
120
Cianciotto v. Hospice Care Network, 927 N.Y.S.2d 779, 784 (Dist. Ct. 2011)
(looking to the contractual setting and whether the manifestation of both parties intent
was sufficient, will determine whether the beneficiary’s reliance was both reasonable
and probable).
121
Id.
122
Id.
123
Id.
124
Saratoga Schenectady Gastroenterology Assocs. v. Bette & Cring, 921 N.Y.S.2d
393, 395 (App. Div. 2011).
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party . . . .’”125 It is imperative, therefore, that negotiators of these jobber
agreements not permit this type of language to enter the contract.
Other cases in which individuals were not granted third party beneficiary
status have rested on whether the agreement was designed with an intent to
benefit that person. New York courts have chosen not to confer third party
beneficiary status in situations such as where a husband tried to assert that
his LLC was an intended beneficiary of the separation agreement he
entered into with his wife,126 or where a subcontractor sought third party
beneficiary status on a contract between a general contractor and the state,
but failed to demonstrated that the contracts intended to benefit the
subcontractor in more than an incidental way.127 Additionally, the Fourth
Department found an incidental benefit in an employment contract between
an employer and employee, not the intent to confer a third-party benefit,
where a couple was being sued by an employee who was injured while
making a delivery at their home.128 These cases reinforce the importance of
intent in the third party beneficiary analysis and should serve as a caution
to organizers to make sure that the language of jobber agreements clearly
evidences an intent to confer third party beneficiary status on employees of
supplier factories, such that workers’ reliance on the notion that brands
have direct responsibility for ensuring the provisions of the jobber
agreement are upheld in supplier factories is deemed reasonable.
Attempts by workers to sue the brands that contract with their employers
are extremely rare. However, in 2009, the Ninth Circuit heard a case
brought by employees of Wal-Mart suppliers in Bangladesh, China,
Indonesia, Nicaragua, and Swaziland.129 A component of their claim
against Wal-Mart alleged that the workers were third-party beneficiaries of
the code of conduct that Wal-Mart incorporated into contracts with all of its
suppliers.130 Plaintiffs alleged that they were third-party beneficiaries to
Wal-Mart’s obligation to both inspect the facilities of its suppliers and to
maintain the working conditions outlined in the code of conduct.131 The
Court held, however, that Wal-Mart did not actually have a duty to inspect
the factories or require the maintenance of certain working conditions.132
Specifically, the Court found, “[t]he language and structure of the
agreement show that Wal-Mart reserved the right to inspect the suppliers,
125
See, e.g., Greece Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Tetra Tech Eng’rs., 911 N.Y.S.2d 563, 564
(App. Div. 2010).
126
Reads Co. v. Katz, 900 N.Y.S.2d 131 (App. Div. 2010).
127
IMS Engineers-Architects v. State, 858 N.Y.S.2d 486 (App. Div. 2008).
128
Chavis v. Klock, 846 N.Y.S.2d 490 (App. Div. 2007).
129
Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677 (9th Cir. 2009).
130
Id. at 681.
131
Id. at 681-82.
132
Id. at 681.
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but did not adopt a duty to inspect them.”133 There is also recent precedent
for garment workers from an Adidas supplier factory in Indonesia to be
permitted to intervene as a third party a lawsuit between the University of
Wisconsin and Adidas.134 At issue in the suit between the University and
one of its licensees is whether Adidas failed to comport with the wage and
severance requirements laid out in the University’s code of conduct.135
Jobber agreements provide a distinct advantage over codes of conduct in
this regard. The language of these agreements, tracking the language
developed through the Designated Suppliers Program, would require that
brands affirmatively undertake the duty to increase the prices they pay to
supplier factories at a level sufficient for those suppliers to pay a living
wage, as well as the responsibility to maintain long-term relationships with
those supplier factories so that improved wages and working conditions can
be sustained. Thus, beyond simply permitting inspection and crafting a set
of standards, jobber agreements would require brands to take action.
Language should also be included in the jobber agreements requiring
brands to explicitly take steps to ensure that the right to organize is
respected in its supplier factories. This language would clearly distinguish
jobber agreements from codes of conduct, such as that of Wal-Mart, and
would alleviate the Ninth Circuit’s concerns regarding the existence of an
affirmative contractual duty.
PART V
FORUM NON CONVENIENS: A CAUTIONARY TALE
Forum non conveniens is a legal claim raised by a defendant who feels
that being subject to a lawsuit in a United States court is inconvenient.
Most forum non conveniens arguments are circumvented in breach of
contract cases by the inclusion of forum selection clauses directly in the
contract.136 The policy behind this phenomenon largely centers around
courts’ desire to uphold the provisions of contracts as parties agreed to
them. The Southern District of New York recently found, for example:
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Id. at 681-82.
Noah Goetzel, Court Says Former Adidas Workers Can Testify in Suit, THE
BADGER HERALD, Jan. 24, 2013, available at:
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importance of permitting contracting parties to choose where litigation should occur
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INTERNATIONAL LAW, Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, available at http://
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[W]here it can be said with reasonable assurance that at the time
they entered the contract, the parties to a freely negotiated private
international commercial agreement contemplated the claimed
inconvenience, it is difficult to see why any such claim of
inconvenience should be heard to render the forum clause
unenforceable.137
As U.S. courts are often hostile to foreign plaintiffs suing U.S.
corporations in the absence of a proper forum selection clause, jobber
agreement negotiators must view recent forum non conveniens cases as a
warning to take steps to ensure that a foreign union can sue a U.S. brand for
violation of a jobber agreement in U.S. courts.138 To ensure that a forum
non conveniens claim by a brand is unsuccessful, jobber agreements must
explicitly include a provision stating both that U.S. law governs the
agreement, and that the parties are subject to suit for breach of contract
within the courts of the United States. More specifically, these agreements
should state that New York law presides over the agreements and that the
brands subject themselves to the jurisdiction of New York Courts. As
stated earlier, many major garment brands are headquartered in New York,
so New York is an obvious choice for the convenience of these
companies.139 New York also has the added distinction of upholding
mandatory forum selection clauses as a matter of law.140
Absent a sound forum selection clause, a U.S. brand could make a forum
non conveniens argument and attempt to remove a breach of contract case
from the jurisdiction of United States courts.141 Forum non conveniens may
be raised by a defendant who feels as though “a more appropriate forum
may hear the claim.”142 Often, defendants make a forum non conveniens
argument because they believe that a plaintiff will not re-file the case and
137
Eastman Chem. Co. v. Nestle Waters Mgmt. & Tech., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
99123, 6 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2011).
138
See, e.g., Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981) (demonstrating that
the Court prioritizes preventing forum shopping over the plaintiff’s convenience).
139
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on including choice of law and choice of forum clauses for the state in which they are
headquartered, that state’s laws must be looked at by the unions involved in negotiating
the jobber agreement. Many companies have offices in New York, even if they are
headquartered elsewhere, so NY is not likely to be inconvenient. This article is limited
to analyzing New York jurisprudence.
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N.Y. Gen. Oblig. Law § 5-1402 (McKinney 2011).
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Presumably, the brand would argue the case is better suited to be heard in the
country where the factory is located.
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John R. Wilson, Coming to America to File Suit: Foreign Plaintiffs and the
Forum Non Conveniens Barrier in Transnational Litigation, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 659, 661
(2004).
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the litigation will end.143 This may be an increasingly valid argument as
several countries, particularly in Latin America, have adopted statutes
prohibiting the filing of a case once that case has been dismissed in a
foreign jurisdiction.144 In contrast, “where a party to a contract has agreed
in advance of litigation to submit to the jurisdiction of a court, she is later
precluded from attacking that court's jurisdiction on grounds of forum non
conveniens.”145 Including choice of law and forum selection clauses within
jobber agreements is particularly important in light of recent forum non
conveniens jurisprudence.
The most recent United States Supreme Court case to address the issue
of forum non conveniens held that it is a threshold issue, and thus may be
decided upon without a court first resolving whether it has subject matter
jurisdiction over the case.146 The forum non conveniens doctrine gives trial
courts significant deference, as higher courts reverse such decisions only if
the trial court clearly abused its discretion.147 According to the Supreme
Court, “[a] federal court has discretion to dismiss a case on the ground of
forum non conveniens ‘when an alternative forum has jurisdiction to hear
the case, and . . . trial in the chosen forum would establish . . .
oppressiveness and vexation to a defendant . . . out of all proportion to
plaintiff’s convenience, or . . . the chosen forum is inappropriate because of
considerations affecting the court’s own administrative and legal
problems.’”148
The Court went on to say that although the defendant carries a heavy
burden when opposing the plaintiff’s chosen forum, this burden lessens
when the plaintiff’s choice is not its home forum.149 Although the Supreme
Court has provided that an adequate alternative forum must exist, and a
series of private and public interest factors must be considered,150 many
143
Cassandra Burke Robertson, Transnational Litigation and Institutional Choice, 51
B.C. L. REV. 1081, 1130 (2010).
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Id. at 1093.
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Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh v. Worley, 690 N.Y.S.2d 57 (App. Div.
1999).
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Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malaysia Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 425 (2007).
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Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 257 (1981).
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See Sinochem, 549 U.S. at 423 (emphasis omitted) (such requirements include an
alternative forum where jurisdiction exists and prejudice and inconvenience would
occur in the chosen forum or administrative and legal problems would arise and
adversely affect the chosen forum).
149
Id. at 430 (emphasis omitted) (noting that there is a presumption in the plaintiff’s
favor, but that it “applies with less force” when the plaintiff does not choose its home
forum).
150
“An interest to be considered, and the one likely to be most pressed, is the private
interest of the litigant. Important considerations are the relative ease of access to
sources of proof; availability of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling, and
the cost of obtaining attendance of willing, witnesses; possibility of view of premises,
if view would be appropriate to the action; and all other practical problems that make
trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive. There may also be questions as to the
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courts have not directly applied these factors and “the forum non
conveniens doctrine does not lend itself to the development of a
comprehensive legal model for predicting the outcomes of forum non
conveniens decisions.”151 As such, it is best to analogize to a series of cases
with what would likely be similar facts—those cases brought under the
Alien Tort Claims Act.152
The Alien Tort Claims Act, originally part of the Judiciary Act of 1789,
states, “The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil
action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of
nations or a treaty of the United States.”153 Since the seminal case of
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,154 plaintiffs have used the Alien Tort Claims Act to
bring claims in U.S. courts for the violation of human rights in other
nations.155 Workers rights are human rights, and although the cases at issue
would be brought for breach of contract and not tort claims, many of the
injuries would be similar. If brands fail to comply with the terms of jobber
agreements and do not provide a healthy, safe, working environment in
their supplier factories, workers could suffer physical injury, long-term
health consequences, and even death. Forced confinement and slavery are
remarkably common in the garment industry as well.156
The idea that workers rights are human rights is internationally
recognized. According to Amnesty International:
enforceability of a judgment if one is obtained . . . . Factors of public interest also have
place in applying the doctrine. Administrative difficulties follow for courts when
litigation is piled up in congested centers instead of being handled at its origin. Jury
duty is a burden that ought not to be imposed upon the people of a community which
has no relation to the litigation. In cases which touch the affairs of many persons, there
is reason for holding the trial in their view and reach rather than in remote parts of the
country where they can learn of it by report only. There is a local interest in having
localized controversies decided at home. There is an appropriateness, too, in having the
trial of a diversity case in a forum that is at home with the state law that must govern
the case, rather than having a court in some other forum untangle problems in conflict
of laws, and in law foreign to itself.” Gulf Oil v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508-09 (1947).
151
Christopher A. Whytock, Politics and the Rule of Law in Transnational Judicial
Governance: The Case of Forum Non Conveniens (Duke Univ. Working Paper, 2008),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=969033.
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The underlying legal claims arise from different causes of action—one torts and
one breach of contracts. However, the forum non conveniens arguments would be
similar as both would consist of foreign plaintiffs suing U.S. corporations for failing to
fulfill their obligations, resulting in the deprivation of the human rights of citizens of
foreign countries.
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Alien’s Action for Tort, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2011).
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630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
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See, e.g., Brian Byrnes, Victims Break Chains of Slavery, THE CNN FREEDOM
PROJECT ENDING MODERN DAY SLAVERY (Apr. 18, 2011), http://thecnnfreedomproject
.blogs.cnn.com/2011/04/18/victims-break-chains-of-slavery/ (providing stories of
exploited victims, stressing the vast number of clandestine factories).
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Under international law, all workers have a human right to
organize and to bargain collectively. These rights are an
essential foundation to the realization of other rights, and are
enshrined inthe Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the
International Covenanton Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
and the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights
of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, as well
as conventions adopted
by
the
International
Labor
157
Organization.
The International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights,
which along with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, make up the International
Bill of Human Rights, provides,
The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of
everyone to the enjoyment of just and favourable conditions of
work which ensure, in particular:
(a) Remuneration which provides all workers, as a minimum,
with:
(i) Fair wages and equal remuneration for work of equal value
without distinction of any kind, in particular women being
guaranteed conditions of work not inferior to those enjoyed by
men, with equal pay for equal work;
(ii) A decent living for themselves and their families in
accordance with the provisions of the present Covenant;
(b) Safe and healthy working conditions;
(c) Equal opportunity for everyone to be promoted in his
employment to an appropriate higher level, subject to no
considerations other than those of seniority and competence;
(d ) Rest, leisure and reasonable limitation of working hours and
periodic holidays with pay, as well as remuneration for public
holidays158
157

Workers Have a Right to Organize, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL (Feb. 19, 2011),
http://blog.amnestyusa.org/us/workers-have-a-right-to-organize/ (emphasis omitted). It
is worth noting, however, that the U.S. has not ratified International Labor
Organization Conventions 87 or 98 (dealing with the freedom of association and right
to organize respectively), the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, or the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant
Workers and Members of Their Families.
158
Int’l Covenant on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, G.A. RES. 2200A (XXI), at art. 7
(Dec. 16, 1966), available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/cescr.htm; see also
993 U.N.T.S. 14531, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY
&mtdsg_no=IV-3&chapter=4&lang=en (reflecting that the United States has signed
but not ratified the Covenant).

2013] THE FUTURE OF THE STUDENT ANTI-SWEATSHOP MOVEMENT

145

In Article 8, the Covenant provides,
1. The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to ensure:
(a) The right of everyone to form trade unions and join the trade
union of his choice, subject only to the rules of the organization
concerned, for the promotion and protection of his economic and
social interests. No restrictions may be placed on the exercise of
this right other than those prescribed by law and which are
necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national
security or public order or for the protection of the rights and
freedoms of others.159
Thus, the right to form and join trade unions is a fundamental human
right. If brands refuse to honor the terms of jobber agreements, which
would require that supplier factories respect the right to organize and
collectively bargain, it would therefore be a violation of internationally
recognized human rights norms.
Unfortunately, however, recent Second Circuit opinions have limited and
significantly weakened the ability of foreign plaintiffs to bring human
rights claims through the Alien Tort Claims Act against U.S. corporations.
In 2000, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld
plaintiffs’ choice of forum where the defendants were foreign corporations
alleged to have collaborated with the Nigerian government in the
perpetuation of human rights abuses in Nigeria.160 In Wiwa v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum Co.,161 the Court “emphasize[d] the U.S. interest in adjudicating
human rights violations and appear[ed] to raise the bar for granting forum
non conveniens dismissals.”162
Quickly, however, the Court moved to limit its holding in Wiwa. The
following year, the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York found that the U.S. interest in adjudicating human rights
violations emphasized in Wiwa is only significant in cases that involve
torture and thus implicate the Torture Victims Protection Act.163 Further
reducing the Alien Tort Claims Act, the Court then found environmental
torts not to come under the protection of the Act because “plaintiffs have
not demonstrated that high levels of environmental pollution within a
nation's borders, causing harm to human life, health, and development,
159

Int’l Covenant, supra note 158, at art. 8.
Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2000).
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Jeffrey E. Baldwin, International Human Rights Plaintiffs and the Doctrine of
Forum Non Conveniens, 40 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 749, 759 (2007).
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Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 142 F. Supp. 2d 534 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (dismissing a case
on grounds of forum non conveniens which was brought by the citizens of Peru and
Ecuador against Texaco, Inc. for the pollution of rainforests and rivers).
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violate ‘well-established, universally recognized norms of international
law.’”164
The Court returned to its Wiwa analysis in 2003, but only because the
case involved allegations of “genocide, war crimes, torture, and
enslavement,” which the court found to be “jus cogens165 violations of
international law.”166 In 2006, the Court further limited the opportunity for
an Alien Tort Claims Act plaintiff to survive a forum non conveniens
motion by finding that “the controlling question is not whether the United
States has some interest in adjudicating the case but whether the U.S.
interest outweighs the alternative forum’s interest.”167 In that case, the
Court found the interest of the United States was outweighed by Turkey,
and consequently granted the defendant’s forum non conveniens motion.168
The case involved Turkish plaintiffs suing Coca-Cola (a United States
corporation) after managers at one of Coca-Cola’s Turkish bottling plants
allegedly assaulted employees who were engaged in a non-violent labor
demonstration.169
Most recently, in 2008, the Court further weakened Wiwa, in a case
brought by a group of “Kurdish women whose husbands were allegedly
imprisoned, tortured, and killed by the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq.”170
The plaintiffs alleged “violations of the law of nations and the Torture
Victims Protection Act ("TVPA") under the Alien Tort Claims Act
(“ATCA”) . . . and common law torts under New York law, for allegedly
providing ‘kickbacks’ to the Hussein regime in connection with their
participation in the United Nations Oil-for-Food Program . . . .”171 The
Court dismissed the case on forum non conveniens grounds finding,
“where, as here, there is an adequate foreign forum with a profound interest
in adjudicating the dispute and litigation here would be significantly less
convenient, the abstract interest of the United States in enforcing
international law does not compel an assertion of jurisdiction.”172 Referring
to the interest of the United States as abstract, and failing to frame that
interest in terms of human rights, likely foreshadows further retreat from
164
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the position of permitting foreign plaintiffs to bring suit in the United
States for human rights abuses committed abroad.
As the Second Circuit continues to roll back the availability of U.S.
courts for plaintiffs alleging violations of international norms, it is critical
that jobber agreements include both a choice of law provision and a forum
selection clause in order to ensure access to U.S. courts for workers in
supplier factories. Because the workers would be alleging a breach of
contract and not a tort, they are not likely to run into as many difficulties as
those plaintiffs alleging jurisdiction under the Alien Tort Claims Act. In the
absence of a proper forum selection provision, the Second Circuit is likely
to continue its trend of not looking favorably on foreign plaintiffs suing
U.S. corporations. Although U.S. unions would also be signatories to the
jobber agreements and could join such lawsuits as non-foreign plaintiffs,
thereby giving plaintiffs’ choice of forum greater deference, foreign unions
would be remiss to rely solely on the often cautious general counsel’s
office of U.S. unions to determine whether to become party to a lawsuit.173
Instead, they should insist on the inclusion of choice of law and forum
selection provisions in all jobber agreements.174
The Supreme Court may be poised to make it even more difficulty for
foreign plaintiffs to bring suit in the United States under the Alien Tort
Statute. On October 1, 2012, The Supreme Court reheard the case of Kiobel
v. Royal Dutch Petroleum. This case was first heard in March of 2012, but
the Court ordered the attorneys to re-file briefs on the issue of “Whether
and under what circumstances the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. §1350,
allows courts to recognize a cause of action for violations of the law of
nations occurring within the territory of a sovereign other than the United
States.”175 The Court’s decision that a presumption against
extraterritoriality applies to the Alien Tort Statute may impact the ability of
garment workers to sue in U.S. Courts where the brands whose garments
they produce are not U.S. brands.176 The Supreme Court’s rollback of the
173
Theoretically, for example, a U.S. union could be in the middle of productive
negotiations with a U.S. brand and decide that it did not want to risk jeopardizing this
relationship by suing that brand for violations of a contract pertaining to a factory in
another country.
174
Of course, it would be wise for U.S. unions to join in any litigation brought under
the jobber agreements because improving conditions in garment factories around the
world would give companies less incentive to produce their apparel in other countries.
This, in turn, could create more manufacturing jobs in the United States and would lead
to an increase in membership for U.S. unions.
175
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protections of the Alien Tort Statute makes it even more imperative that
workers focus on contractual claims and that organizers succeed in
requiring the adoption of comprehensive jobber agreements.
PART VI: PRACTICAL IMPLEMENTATION177
Implementation of jobber agreements in the collegiate apparel
market will require multiple levels of strategic organizing on the part of
both student and worker organizations. Initially, these groups will have to
decide which brands to target first. The decision must be based on a
number of factors, including which brands have the most influence in the
collegiate apparel industry and which brands are most susceptible to public
pressure. Two brands immediately come to mind: Nike and Knights
Apparel. Nike is an obvious choice because it is extremely conscious of its
public image and has fought for years against allegations of sweatshop
abuses in its supplier factories. This sensitivity, and its history of
engagement with university licensing officials, student activists, and unions
in various countries around its corporate social responsibility programs
renders Nike particularly well equipped for swift implementation of a
jobber agreement.
Knights Apparel, while not a brand whose name is well known to most
consumers, “is the leading supplier of college-logo apparel to American
universities . . . .”178 The company has already shown a commitment to
exploring some of the tenets of a jobber agreement, including payment of a
premium by brands to factories to ensure that employees of those factories
earn a decent wage, and a willingness to allow the Worker Rights
Consortium to monitor factory conditions. In 2003, workers at the BJ&B
factory in Alta Gracia, Dominican Republic organized a union and forced
their employer, who produced for major collegiate apparel brands such as
Nike and Reebok, to pay them higher wages, provide clean water, and
improve conditions.179 In 2007, however, Nike and Reebok pulled all of
their orders out of BJ&B, causing the factory to shut down, as it relied on
those companies for a significant percentage of its total orders.180 A couple
177
As an attorney, I recognize that practical implementation is better left to the
organizers on the ground. However, as a former organizer myself, I cannot resist the
temptation to provide a few skeletal thoughts. Most of these ideas have come from
conversations with the organizers themselves.
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of years later, after continued organizing by both students and workers, the
employees who were laid off from BJ&B were hired by the Alta Gracia
factory, which is owned by Knights Apparel. This factory pays its
“employees nearly three and a half times the prevailing minimum wage,”
respects the employees’ union, and has opened itself up to continuous
monitoring of working conditions by the WRC.181 Joseph Bozich, the CEO
of Knights Apparel, regularly touts the company’s efforts at Alta Gracia.182
An agreement to replicate these conditions in all of Knights Apparel’s
supplier factories would push the company even farther, compelling it to
demonstrate that it is truly committed to the people who make their
products.
Knights Apparel and Nike are merely suggestions, of course. Any
determination of a target must be made in consultation with the workers
whose unions would be signing the first agreements and must take into
consideration what brands are producing collegiate apparel in their
countries, and in what quantities. A small group of unions would most
likely have to be convened in order to make initial implementation
possible. Once this group of unions joins together, they can create a
consortium that would coordinate negotiations, implementation, and future
participation by other unions and brands. Unions with which USAS already
has a working relationship are likely candidates for early collaboration,
such as unions in Haiti,183 Honduras,184 the Dominican Republic,185
Kenya,186 and the United States.187 Representatives from these unions
181
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would need to decide exactly how a consortium could operate to further all
of their interests and how negotiations would take place. Presumably, the
consortium would choose representatives to enter into negotiations. Brands
would then negotiate with the consortium directly, and multiple member
unions would become signatories to each agreement.
Students’ primary role would be to run a two-layered campaign,
simultaneously targeting both brands and their university administrators.
On the one hand, students would demand their universities agree to only
source collegiate apparel from brands that have signed jobber agreements.
This could be implemented gradually with the percentage of collegiate
apparel required to be produced by brands that signed on to jobber
agreements increasing as the number of brands who have signed the
agreements increases. Individual universities would decide whether or not
to adopt a policy requiring licensees to sign jobber agreements. Universities
that have already expressed a commitment to the principles of the DSP
should consider the jobber agreement approach an extension of the DSP
and thus ought to readily adopt policies requiring licensees to sign jobber
agreements.188 Each university would, in turn, put additional pressure on
brands that want to continue to produce collegiate apparel, as the school’s
new policy of sourcing primarily from brands that have signed jobber
agreements would push orders towards those brands that have adopted
jobber agreements.
In addition to organizing on campus, students would target the brands
directly and urge them to sign on to jobber agreements. USAS has a long
history of this type of organizing, and can pressure brands by threatening to
attack their image not only on campuses, but also in retail stores, at
company events, and on the internet through social media websites and
other online organizing techniques. Students can also reach out to their
allies in community anti-sweatshop groups, unions that represent workers
in other industries, and student and community groups in other countries
of America. USAS has also collaborated on solidarity campaigns with garment factory
workers in the United States. See, e.g., Hats Off: A U.S. Cap Company Gets a Hard
Look from Universities, WALL STREET JOURNAL (Apr. 2, 2002), http://www43.
homepage.villanova.edu/louis.giglio/index2.html.
188
These schools include Brandeis University, Brown University, California State
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Duke University, Fordham University, Georgetown University, Grand Valley State
University, Hamilton College, Indiana University, Marquette University, Oberlin
College, Purdue University, Regis University, Santa Clara University, Seattle
University, Skidmore College, Smith College, Syracuse University, the State
University of New York at Albany, the entire University of California system, the
University of Connecticut, the University of Iowa, the University of Maine –
Farmington, the University of Miami, the University of Michigan, the University of
North Carolina at Chapel Hill, the University of Wisconsin – Madison, Ursinus
College, Washington State University, and Western Washington University. College
and University Policy Statements, WORKER RIGHTS CONSORTIUM, http://www.
workersrights.org/dsp.asp (last visited June 5, 2012).

2013] THE FUTURE OF THE STUDENT ANTI-SWEATSHOP MOVEMENT

151

where these brands sell goods, and enlist their organizing assistance. All of
this organizing will be done alongside garment workers organizing at the
factory level and in their communities where brands value their image as
benevolent employers. Given that supplier factory owners would also reap
the benefits of higher premiums and long-term relationships (which would
allow their factories to stay open longer and permit better planning as they
could count on consistent orders), factory managers may also begin to
encourage brands to sign jobber agreements.
CONCLUSION
United Students Against Sweatshops is arguably the most successful
student activist organization in modern history. Their ability to alter the
way consumers view the role and responsibilities of multinational
corporations in global systems of production is unprecedented. In addition,
their ability to use a solidarity model to effect concrete change in the lives
of garment workers (as well as university employees and workers in the
communities in which they live) is remarkable. USAS has continuously
altered its organizing strategy to meet the ever-changing challenges of the
global supply chain. Adopting a strategy of pursuing jobber agreements is a
logical next step. Jobber agreements would give garment workers far
greater recourse than they currently possess, and would provide an avenue
for increased accountability among collegiate apparel brands. The
agreements could be drafted relatively easily in a manner that renders moot
all preliminary legal concerns and permits employees of supplier factories
to have their cases against major apparel brands heard in U.S. courts on the
merits. The collegiate apparel industry is a microcosm of the larger global
garment industry, which has been the prototype for global supply chain
production in countless other industries. As such, the impact of the success
of jobber agreements in the collegiate apparel industry could reverberate
exponentially, serving as a model for organizers in other manufacturing
industries.

